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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Eminent Domain-Public Use in North Carolina
The nature and character of "public use" sufficient to justify an
exercise of the power of eminent domain has again been considered
by the North Carolina Supreme Court. In State Highway Comm'n
v. Batts1 the Highway Commission sought to exercise the power
of eminent domain over the lands of the defendant and of a Mrs.
Joyner to construct a cul-de-sac2 to serve three property owners
whose property did not abut a public road. There were four families
living on these properties. Three of the families were related to
the fourth family, that of Mr. W. H. Batts. The lower court,
sitting without a jury, held that the proposed road was for a public
use. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed saying the road
was for the private use of W. H. Batts and a few of his relatives
and thus denied the Highway Commission the right to exercise the
power of eminent domain."
A precise definition of public use is impracticable. In City of
Charlotte v. Heath4 the court said: "Perhaps none can be devised
which is not challengeable, since, with the progressive demands of
society and changing concepts of governmental function, new sub-
jects are constantly brought within the authority of eminent do-
main."5 The basic problem in defining public use is that the term
"use" has been interpreted as having two different meanings: "em-
action was commenced was brought under the protection of the court and
was in effect a party to the action and the petitioner as the plaintiff in the
action representing the child was in the same position as a guardian ad
litem and was without power to dismiss the action without the consent of
the court." Id. at 298, 171 Cal. App. 2d at 290. See also Evans v. Taylor,
128 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Ct. App. 1939). There the trial court delayed ruling
on a motion for discontinuance in a habeas corpus proceeding for custody
until the defendant had filed an answer requesting affirmative relief. The
court held that the trial judge was authorized to refuse to act on the motion
until the answer had been filed. Stout v. Pate, 208 Ga. 768, 69 S.E.2d 576
(1952). In this case there was an entry of dismissal by the plaintiff before
the answer in a habeas corpus proceeding for custody. The court held the
dismissal improper. See also Collard v. McCormick, 162 Ga. 116, 132 S.E.
757 (1926); Ex parte Welsh, 93 N.J. Eq. 303, 116 Atl. 23 (1922); EX
parte Rich, 3 N.Y.2d 689 (App. Div. 1938); Commonwealth ex rel. Gimbel
v. Gimbel, 94 Pa. Super. 577 (1928); McClendon v. McClendon, 289 S.W.2d
640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
1265 N.C. 346, 144 S.E.2d 126 (1965).
2 "A blind alley; a street which is open at one end only." BLAcx, LAW
DrCTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).8265 N.C. at 360, 144 S.E.2d at 136.
'226 N.C. 750, 40 S.E.2d 600 (1946).
r Id. at 755, 40 S.E.2d at 604.
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ployment" or "use by the public" and "advantage" or "public
benefit." 6 The "use by the public" test is considered a strict inter-
pretation7 while the "public advantage" test is considered a broad
interpretation of the term.'
The North Carolina Supreme Court apparently uses a combina-
tion of the two tests as it has not specifically adopted either one.
In Cozard v. Hardwood Co.,9 a lumber company wanted to con-
struct a railroad across an individual's land so that a large tract
of timber could be harvested. The lumber company pointed out
that new land would be open for cultivation, that new tanneries and
factories would be established in the area to utilize the byproducts
of the logging industry that would otherwise be wasted, that immi-
gration would occur to fill the available jobs, and that many other
benefits would accrue to the public.:' However, the lumber company
only wanted its trains to be able to use the proposed tracks. Even
though the public advantage would have been immense, the use by
the public would have been negligible. After weighing the consider-
ations of both tests, the court denied the company permission to
build the railroad. The court seemed to give great weight to whether
or not the public would have a full and unrestricted right to use
the way, which in turn would determine the public character of the
facility."
In Reed v. State Highway & Pub. Works Conm'n' 2 the court
permitted the Highway Commission to condemn property to con-
struct a road that would provide an outlet for five homes from the
top of a mountain to the county seat and also would serve as part
of a scenic highway. While the number of people actually using
the road would be limited, the court did envision some public benefit
because it would tend to promote tourism. The court felt having
scenic roads would induce tourists to come to an area and spend
:2 NIcHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.2 (3d ed. 1963).
Id. § 7.2[1]. Thus if a sufficient number of people will use the subject
of the power of eminent domain, it will be a permitted public use.8Id. § 7.2[2]. Thus if people generally in the community or state will
benefit from the exercise of the power of eminent domain, regardless of
whether they use the subject the power is exercised upon, it will be a per-
mitted public use, i.e., if it will create a better economy or if the general
welfare will be improved, it is for the public advantage.139 N.C. 283, 51 S.E. 932 (1905).10 Id. at 290, 51 S.E. at 935.
11Id. at 288, 51 S.E. at 934.
12209 N.C. 648, 184 S.E. 513 (1936).
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the summer and put money into circulation, which would benefit
all the people in the area.13 The fact that more money is put into
circulation and thus a public benefit results, standing alone, should
be insufficient to qualify as a public use that would support condem-
nation of private property. However, when coupled with the fact
that it will be used by the public, though limited in number, the
condemnation is more reasonable. Thus it seems the court has used
a combination of both tests to support a public use in Reed.
In City of Charlotte v. Heath14 the court recognized that a pub-
lic convenience would constitute a public use when the public has a
legal right to make use of the convenience. 5 Seventeen families
were to be served by a sewer line extension. The court said: "The
public nature of the project cannot be made to depend on a numeri-
cal count of those to be served or the smallness or largeness of a
community."" While the number of the public actually using the
proposed sewer line was limited, there was some general public ad-
vantage in that odors and insect growth were controlled. Again
public advantage and use by the public tests were used in conjunc-
tion with each other and the condemnation was sustained.
Perhaps the Batts decision can be explained in that it failed one
if not both of these tests. The court apparently did not think there
would be any general public advantage because it felt "that any use
by, or any benefit for, the general public will be only incidental
and purely conjectural. . . ."" The number of the public that would
have actually used the road would have been limited since it would
have served only four families and would have been a dead-end
road also. But, the court did not discuss the right of the general
public to use the road that was considered in Cozard v. Hardwood
Co.' 8
Many courts declare that if the public has a right to use the
road, it is immaterial that some people will benefit from the road
more than others, or that only a few people will use the road, or
that one end does not terminate at a public place, or that it is very
'
3 Id. at 654, 184 S.E. at 516.
14226 N.C. 750, 40 S.E.2d 600 (1946).
' Id. at 755, 40 S.E.2d at 604.
1 Ibid.
7 265 N.C. at 360, 144 S.E.2d at 136.
1 139 N.C. 283, 51 S.E. 932 (1905).
[Vol. 44
short in length."9 While usually the courts are concerned with a
landlocked party's right to reach a public road, some courts attach
importance to the right of the public to reach the landlocked party
in the event he is summoned as a witness or to sit on a jury.2" A
court recently recognized that a public road to a landlocked property
owner could be justified because it might be used by doctors, nurses,
ambulances, salesmen or farm organization representatives. 2 ' Nor
is the public road allowed only when there is no other means avail-
able for access to the landlocked property.1
2
Perhaps the court considered that the landlocked parties in Batts
had an adequate remedy under the cartway statute23 if they proved
such a way was necessary, reasonable and just. While the court
did not comment on this provision in its opinion, the appellant did
raise this issue on appeal. 24 Apparently weight was given to the
fact that all of the interested parties were related to one of the
property owners. Throughout the opinion the court referred to the
proposed road serving "W. H. Batts and a few of his relatives."
It should be immaterial that these families were related to each
other, but the court did not intimate it would have held otherwise
had they not been related.
The court made it clear it was not holding that the proposed
road was not for a public use merely because it was a cul-de-sac. 2
In effect the court overruled State v. M'Daniel,26 which had held
that a cul-de-sac that did not terminate at a public place was not a
public road.
" E.g., Sherman v. Buick, 32 Cal. 241, 255 (1867); Leach v. Manhart,
102 Colo. 129, 133, 77 P.2d 652, 653 (1938); Hightower v. Chattahoochee
Industrial R.R., 218 Ga. 122, 125, 126 S.E.2d 664, 666 (1962); Taylor v.
Wentz, 15 Ill. 2d 83, 89, 153 N.E.2d 812, 816 (1958); Law v. Neola
Elevator Co., 281 Ill. 143, 150, 117 N.E. 435, 437 (1917); Butte, A. &
Pac. Ry. v. Montana Union Ry., 16 Mont. 504, 523, 41 Pac. 232, 238 (1895) ;
Phillips v. Stockton, 270 S.W.2d 266, 270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) ; Heninger
v. Peery, 102 Va. 896, 899, 47 S.E. 1013, 1014 (1904).
" E.g., Leach v. Manhart, supra note 19; Pagels v. Oaks, 64 Iowa 198,
203, 19 N.W. 905, 907 (1884); Johnson v. Supervisors of Clayton County,
61 Iowa 89, 91, 15 N.W. 856, 857 (1883).
" Tracey v. Preston, 114 Ohio App. 206, 181 N.E.2d 479 (1960).
" Denham v. County Comm'rs of Bristol, 108 Mass. 202 (1871). The
party seeking the public road already had two other accesses to public
roads.
k' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-69 (1964).
,Brief for Appellant, p. 13.
211265 N.C. at 357, 144 S.E.2d at 135.
" 53 N.C, 284 (1860).
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If the Batts decision holds that a cul-de-sac serving only four
families is not a road for a public use, it would seem the State
Highway Commission may encounter problems of using public
funds to maintain other dead-end roads on the Secondary Road
System that serve only a limited number of families. Any taxpayer
would have standing to bring suit to prevent misuse of agency
[State Highway Commission] powerY7 The court said: "To sus-
tain the proposed condemnation . . . under the facts and circum-
stances here would set a dangerous precedent for the expenditure
of public funds by the State Highway Commission .. .*"I How-
ever, there was not an expenditure of public funds under the facts
and circumstances here because the landlocked parties had given
the Highway Commission an indemnity bond to cover any damages
to the defendants' property. The only expenditure of funds would
be for the construction and maintenance of the road, not acquiring
the right of way.
Also in the light of the Batts decision, it seems that the State
Highway Commission will have to alter its administrative policy
of adding roads and streets to the Secondary Road System which
is maintained by the Commission. At the present time the Commis-
sion policy requirements are: "(2) Roads less than one mile in
length must have at least four occupied residences fronting the
road.... (4) There must be at least two individual property own-
ers on 'the road."29 The proposed road in Batts met both these
requirements.
HAROLD D. COLSTON
Evidence-Admissibility of Agent's Declaration Against His
Principal
The plaintiff's decedent in Branch v. Dempsey' was fatally in-
jured in a head-on collision with the defendant owner's truck being
operated by the defendant driver in the scope of his employment.2
", Stratford v. City of Greensboro, 124 N.C. 127, 32 S.E. 394 (1899).
28 265 N.C. at 360, 144 S.E.2d at 137.2 9N.C. STATE HIGHWAY COMM'N, SECONDARY ROADs 14.
'265 N.C. 733, 145 S.E.2d 395 (1965).
2The agency relationship between the owner and his driver was pre-
sumptively established by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-71.1(b) (Supp 1965), which
provides:
Proof of the registration of a motor vehicle in the name of any
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